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Abstract 
 
Women typically earn less than men.  The reasons are not fully understood.   Previous studies 
argue that this may be because (i) women ‘don’t ask’ and (ii) the reason they fail to ask is out of 
concern for the quality of their relationships at work.  This account is difficult to assess with 
standard labor-economics data sets.  Hence we examine direct survey evidence.  Using matched 
employer-employee data from 2013-14, the paper finds that the women-don’t-ask account is 
incorrect.  Once an hours-of-work variable is included in ‘asking’ equations, hypotheses (i) and 
(ii) can be rejected.  Women do ask.  However, women do not get.     
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“Women don’t like to negotiate.” 
 
“Why don’t women ask for themselves? Socialization as children, types of acceptable  
behavior for adult women,...” 
 
http://www.womendontask.com/stats.html 
 
1. Introduction 
This paper explores one of the major puzzles of the modern workplace.  Across the 
industrialized world, female workers typically earn less than their male counterparts.   It is still not 
fully understood why this pattern -- one consistent with the existence of gender discrimination -- 
persists.1  This study offers a new, and particularly simple, form of survey evidence.  It constructs 
a test of two oft-heard claims, namely, that:  
(i) Claim 1: Women intrinsically do not ask for pay rises; 
(ii) Claim 2: The reason that women do not ask is because they are more concerned 
than men about the quality of their relationships in the workplace. 
One reason why it seems important to scrutinize this theoretical account is that the theory assigns 
at least part of the responsibility for gender differentials on to female workers and their actions. 
We estimate econometric ‘asking’ equations.  Despite the prominence of the above 
conceptual account (for example, the heavily cited books by Babcock & Laschever 2003 and 
Sandberg 20132), this study is not able to find empirical support for either (i) or (ii).  Instead, to 
anticipate the paper’s later findings, the evidence suggests that -- once we are able to control for 
variables unavailable to prior researchers such as the authors of the important book by Babcock 
                                                          
1 For statements of the latest evidence, see Azmat and Petrongolo (2014) and Blau and Kahn (2016).      
2 Journal articles include Bowles et al. (2007).      
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and Laschever -- women do ask but they do not get. 3,4   The data used in this study are for the year 
2013/14.  One possibility is that negotiating behavior in the modern era has begun to change. 5  
In most of the survey data sets used by labor economists, it is hard to assess Claim 1 and 
Claim 2.  The reason is that the information gathered in conventional surveys is on people’s actual 
earnings (rather than on whether workers are ‘asking’) and on other objective aspects of 
workplaces (rather than on underlying psychological reasons and attitudes).  This may be why 
little formal testing of these ideas has been done on real-world field data, even though there is 
evidence, largely from the laboratory, to suggest that women may shy away from competition 
(Niederle & Vesterlund 2007, 2010, 2011; Gneezy et al. 2003, 2009; Booth and Nolen 2012; 
Shurchkov 2012; Garrat et al. 2013; Flory et al. 2015).   
The present paper uses a different, and direct, form of survey evidence.  The study is 
conceptually a simple one.  Nevertheless, it has two advantages that have been denied to most, and 
perhaps all, previous researchers on the topic of gender differentials.  First, the sampled individuals 
here are questioned in detail about their motives, behavior, and histories.  Unlike in standard data 
sets, therefore, it is in principle possible -- admittedly in an imperfect way -- to inquire into ‘why’ 
women and men choose to act in the ways observed6.  Second, our data are from matched worker-
employer surveys in which random samples of male and female employees can be studied.  This 
is a valuable feature for the present inquiry.  It makes it possible to control for a large number of 
                                                          
3 In particular, the studies described in Babcock and Laschever (2003) could not control for the number of hours 
worked, and our later results suggest that it is principally this, rather than gender itself, that is associated with ‘not 
asking’.   
4 To our knowledge, no previous study has documented our result.  However, there is one important and potentially 
related conclusion in the literature.  Leibbrandt and List (2015) find in a field experiment that when workers are 
assigned to a job where the possibility of negotiation is mentioned there is no statistically significant difference 
between the negotiation approach of the males and females in their sample.      
5 Consistent with this, although not conclusive, because we cannot separate cohort and age effects, is that young 
women and young men in our data set appear to act in identical ways (see Appendix 1A).       
6 We would accept, if necessary, the more exact wording “..into why women and men say they choose to act...”      
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background factors about workplaces that are not observable to the econometrician and would be 
impossible to allow for properly in many of the conventional data sets.  The paper’s later 
econometric estimates are thus ‘within-employer’.    
The paper follows in the intellectual footsteps of previous researchers such as Arrow 
(1973), Becker (1957), Aigner and Cain (1977), Frank (1978), Barron et al. (1993), Blau and Beller 
(1988), Lazear and Rosen (1990), Albrecht et al. (2003), and Blackaby et al. (2005).  It links to a 
growing modern literature on why females have less success in the labor market.  Various ideas 
have been proposed (here we follow sources such as Goodall and Osterloh 2016).  One is that 
women might consciously choose a less ambitious career path than men -- with concomitantly 
lower salaries7 (Eagly, 1987; Eagly and Karau, 2002).  Another hypothesis is that it may be risky 
for females to be ambitious.  Some research suggests that if women deviate from a perceived 
female stereotype, this can produce “identity costs” for the individuals, and if women behave “out 
of role” (Heilman 2001; Heilman & Okimoto, 2007; Inzlicht 2011) they may be less popular in 
professional life.  In one laboratory experiment, for instance, it was shown that males dislike 
females who negotiate (Bowles, Babcock & Lai 2007).   Moreover, women who display anti-
stereotypical behaviour are sometimes accused of exhibiting poor social skills (Phelan, Moss-
Racusin & Rudman, 2008).  Lastly, all such beliefs can become “self-fulfilling-prophecies” 
(Merton, 1948: 195).  The performance of individuals who belong to negatively stereotyped groups 
is lower (Schmader & Johns, 2003).  Girls’ mathematics scores decrease when their gender is made 
salient (Spencer et al., 1999).  The same happens for performance in competitions (Guenther et al., 
2010), and in risk-aversion (Booth & Nolen, 2012).   
                                                          
7 It has been argued that more than 50 percent of male candidates negotiate their salary after the first job offer following 
graduation, but only ten percent of females -- see Babcock et al. 2006 (and Babcock & Laschever, 2003). 
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We are interested in the particular issue of pay gaps between men and women.  As Blau 
and Kahn (2016) carefully put it, a distinctive hypothesis is that: 
  “Women’s lower propensity to negotiate over salaries, raises, or promotions, could 
reduce their pay relative to men’s. The observed gender difference could reflect social factors, 
including women being socialized to feel that they are being pushy or overbearing…” 
Similar ideas have been suggested in modern work by Mazei et al. (2015), Leibbrandt and 
List (2015), and Croson and Gneezy (2009).  This emerging literature has documented various 
kinds of differences, under controlled laboratory conditions, between the actions of males and 
females.     
 
2. The Data Set 
The data source used in the analysis is a representative sample of Australian employees 
and workplaces.  The recently available Australian Workplace Relations Survey (AWRS) covers 
2013-2014.  It has the distinctive feature that it asks individuals a set of questions about whether 
their pay is set by negotiation with the company, whether they have successfully obtained a wage 
rise since joining the employer, whether they preferred not to attempt to negotiate a pay rise 
because they were concerned about their relationships, why they decided that, and about their 
levels of satisfaction.  
 Using these new AWRS data, Tables 1 and 2 provide descriptive information about the 
sample.  The data set offers information on approximately 4600 randomly sampled workers across 
840 workplaces.  For the later analysis, we will be especially interested in answers to questions 
asking for information such as whether: 
 “I have not attempted to attain a better wage/salary for myself since I commenced 
employment with this employer” 
 6 
 
 
“Why have you not attempted to attain a better wage/promotion for yourself since you 
commenced your employment? … I’m concerned about negative effects on my relationship with 
my manager/employer” 
 
“I have successfully attained a better wage/salary for myself through negotiating with my 
manager/employer (i.e. without changing roles)” 
 
We will, for example, set a dummy to equal zero if respondents agreed with "I have not 
attempted to attain a better wage/salary for myself since I commenced employment with this 
employer", and equal to one if they did not agree with the statement.  This can then be treated as a 
dependent variable in a regression equation, and standard demographic and workplace variables 
then included as independent variables.   
In the data set, a little over half of workers are female, and the mean age of the sample is 
slightly under 41 years old.  For 20% of the workforce, the highest educational qualification is a 
bachelor’s degree.  A further 16% of workers have further degrees.  These proportions on 
educational attainment do not vary greatly across males and females.  Just over half the sample are 
married, and for 86% of employees their language used at home is English.  Fulltime workers 
make up 64% of the sample.  At the mean, the number of hours worked is 37 per week.  Table 2 
gives data broken down by gender.  
The paper’s focus is upon what happens during pay-setting.  Approximately 39% of 
employees say, as shown in Table 1, that they are in a job where they negotiate their salary with 
the company.  This proportion is broadly comparable to the U.S. figure of 33% reported in Hall 
and Krueger (2012) 8.   In the raw data of Table 2, women are noticeably less likely than men to 
say they are in a job where they negotiate wages.  The figure for males is approximately 48%; the 
                                                          
8 As in Table 3 of Hall and Krueger (2012).      
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figure for females is approximately 33%.  Although the authors do not focus upon the issue of 
gender, Hall and Krueger report a figure of 25% for U.S. females.   
In AWRS, information is also available on whether employees say they have attempted to 
attain a better salary since they commenced employment with the organization.  Here, in Table 2, 
it can be seen that 75% of males say they have asked for a pay rise, while 66% of women have 
asked.  Hence, in terms of Claim 1 above, it is true as a descriptive statement that women ask less 
(when joining and when inside the employer).  Later tables explore whether that remains true when 
other characteristics are held constant.  Table 2 also reveals that 14.6% of males say they have not 
attempted to obtain a pay rise because of concern for their relationships in the workplace.  A 
smaller number, 12.9%, of females say this.  Hence, in the raw data, there is no support for Claim 
2 above, that women for such a reason are more wary of requesting a rise in salary.  
 
3. Regression Results 
  Table 3 turns to regression-equation results.  In this table, three dependent variables are 
used.  These are dichotomous answers to questions on ‘My pay is negotiated’, ‘I have successfully 
obtained a pay rise while with the employer’, and ‘I have attempted to obtain a pay rise’.  In each 
of these, there are three columns in the tables, and the regression equations build up to longer 
specifications in right-hand columns as more variables are added.  In all equations, a set of 840 
separate employer dummies have been included.  Hence the estimates are effectively within-
employer.  This has the statistical advantage that a variety of background influences -- that are 
specific to each company but not observable to the statistical investigator -- are held constant.  
Omitting the 840 dummies does not alter the substantive results, although, unsurprisingly, it 
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increases some of the coefficient sizes (these specifications, without the set of employer dummies, 
are available from the authors upon request).   
Columns 3 and 6 of Table 3 suggest there are differences between men and women.  With 
a large number of other covariates included, females are less likely to say that pay is negotiated 
(with a coefficient of -0.060 in column 3) and less likely to say they have been successful in 
obtaining a salary rise while working for the current employer (with a coefficient of -0.04 in 
column 6).  Given the mean success rate of 0.16 in the data, this implies that women are one 
quarter less likely to obtain a raise. A number of the other independent variables enter significantly 
in columns 3 and 6.  Age, for example, enters with a concave shape.  There is evidence that 
individuals with higher levels of education are both more likely to be in a job with negotiation and 
to have been successful in negotiating a pay rise after they joined the employer.  Job tenure enters, 
respectively, negatively in the Negotiated column and positively in the Successful column.  Those 
employees with longer hours of work are more likely to say their pay is set by negotiation, and 
also more likely to say they have been successful in obtaining a salary increase.  
 
4. Not Asking or Not Getting? 
Is it true that women do not ask for pay rises?  Table 3 allows a particularly simple test of 
the hypothesis.  The key evidence is in column 9 of Table 3 and suggests that the null hypothesis 
of zero cannot be rejected.  The analysis finds no statistical difference between men and women 
in the probability of having asked.  This inference rests, crucially, upon the statistical investigator 
having information about the number of hours worked by each employee.  Once the equation 
includes a variable for the number of hours worked, then the column 8 coefficient, in Table 3, of -
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0.048 on Female, with a t-statistic of 2.566, becomes in column 9 a coefficient of -0.026, with a t-
statistic of 1.421.   
There is a potential concern here with Type II errors.  However, -0.026 is a small 
coefficient, and not merely a large one for which the null of zero cannot be rejected, so the chance 
of Type II error does not seem a natural explanation.  The dominant effect, in the last three columns 
of Table 3, is coming not from being a woman per se.  Instead, on closer scrutiny, the appearance 
of a lack of ‘asking’ is being driven statistically by working a shorter number of hours.  Males who 
work shorter hours also ‘do not ask’. 
To check more fully whether the insignificance of gender for ‘asking’ is being caused 
erroneously, Table 4 explores a further permutation.  Here the sample is divided into Part-timers 
and Full-timers, where the cut-off is defined as fewer than 38 hours9.  Table 3’s substantive 
conclusions continue to hold.  Once again, there is no difference, in the ‘I Have Asked’ columns, 
between male workers and female workers.  Column 6 of Table 4 seems of particular importance, 
because this provides a test for full-time males compared to full-time females.  In column 6 of 
Table 3, the coefficient on the female dummy is only -0.015, with a small t-statistic of 0.619.  
A possible cause for concern is the lack of a measure of frequency-of-times that workers 
have asked for a raise at their employer, or a variable for when workers began asking for raises.  It 
might be that men ask for raises earlier and more frequently than women and that this is why men 
are more successful than women at eventually securing a raise.  While the AWRS data do not 
provide full information on this issue, a suitable variable may lie in workers’ tenure.  If men request 
raises earlier and more often than women, we should find a statistically significant difference 
                                                          
9
 The AWRS survey itself defines the cutoff between part-time and full-time work in Australia to be 38 hours per 
week.  As a robustness check, we tried alternate cutoffs of 35 hours and 40 hours, and found no qualitative 
differences in the results.  These estimations are available from the authors upon request. 
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between newer (lower tenure) male and female employees in their requests for raises.  A check for 
this was done.  Appendix 1B presents results among workers with less than 1 year, 3 years, and 5 
years of tenure -- and finds no difference between men and women in how often, or how early, 
they ask for a raise. 
In Table 1, nearly one third of workers said they had not attempted to get a higher wage.  
Among workers who never requested a pay rise, what do they give as reasons for their lack of 
asking?  Tables 5 and 6 provide regression-equation evidence.  They test among a variety of 
verbatim potential explanations that were offered to the interviewees as part of the AWRS survey.  
Column 3 of Table 5 documents weak evidence10 for the fact that women may be being influenced 
by the fact they are more satisfied -- than equivalently qualified men -- with their wage (consistent 
with results in Clark and Oswald, 1996).  However, column 6 of Table 5 implies that it is not 
because women are relatively satisfied -- in comparison with the males answering the same 
question -- with their role in the organization.    
Table 6 explores additional possibilities.  It gives regression equations where, in the three 
columns, the dependent variables are respectively dichotomous variables for ‘I have not asked for 
a salary rise because there is no process here for doing so’; ‘I have not asked for a salary rise 
because I am concerned about negative effects on my relationship with my manager/employer’; ‘I 
have not asked for a salary rise because my role would not be seen as worthy of a higher wage’.  
The female dummy is insignificantly different from zero in each of the columns of Table 6.  These 
findings are pertinent to the hypothesis that female workers do not ask for fear of damage to their 
relationships in the workplace.  Column 2 of Table 6 does not support such a hypothesis.  
Moreover, as before, the estimated coefficient here (of -0.012) is small, and not merely 
                                                          
10 We describe this as ‘weak’ because in column 3 of Table 5 the t-statistic on 0.072 is 1.844.      
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insignificantly different from zero.  Women are apparently not being influenced by a 
disproportionate concern for their relationships. 
It is relevant to inquire into potential differences across age categories.  One possibility is 
that there might be some form of cohort effect.  It could be that younger generations of employees 
have different attitudes to the topic of gender than did their parents.  In our data set, it is not possible 
to distinguish a true cohort-effect from a true age-effect.  However, as in Appendix 1A, it is feasible 
to split the sample into age sub-categories.  Interestingly, for workers under the age of 40, in the 
table of Appendix 1A, there appears to be no difference, in a regression-adjusted sense, between 
males and females in: whether they are in a job where pay is negotiated; whether they have been 
successful in obtaining a rise in pay if they asked for one; whether they did request such a raise.   
Overall, in this sample there are differences across age-groups.  The younger women in the 
labor market appear statistically indistinguishable from the younger men.  Hence it could be that 
negotiating behavior has begun to change.  Future research may be able to calculate whether true 
cohort-effects can be detected.    
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper uses matched employer-employee data to try to understand why females earn 
systematically less than males.  It uses a survey in which employees provide information of a kind 
not typically recorded in nationally representative data sets.  The survey material allows us to 
create within-employer estimates and to explore the hypotheses that, first, women are reluctant to 
ask for pay rises (Claim 1 in the Introduction) and, second, this occurs because they fear for the 
quality of their workplace relationships (Claim 2 in the Introduction).  One reason to probe the 
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strength of this conceptual account is that the theory places some of the responsibility for the 
existence of gender differentials upon female employees and the choices they make. 
The paper estimates ‘asking’ equations.  The results of the empirical testing are 
unfavorable, in these modern data, to the women-don’t-ask account of gender differentials.  Once 
we control for hours of work -- something that was not possible for previous researchers -- so that 
the comparison being made is between full-time males and full-time females, and between part-
time males and part-time females, the regression equations for the likelihood of ‘asking’ find there 
is no difference between men and women.11  This study has also been able to test whether, in 
considering to ask or not, females say they are more cognizant than males of possible deleterious 
effects on their relationships.  There seems not to be evidence for that idea, either, in the data.  
Moreover, it appears that these conclusions are not the result of Type II errors; the key estimated 
coefficients are tiny and not merely insignificantly different from zero.  
In some domains, there are differences between men and women.  Adjusting for all the 
variables available to us, females are less likely to be in a job where they say that pay is negotiated 
(as illustrated in column 3 of Table 3).  They are also less successful in getting a pay raise during 
their time with the employer (as in column 6 of Table 3).  However, when explaining the reasons 
they did not ask for a pay raise, there are almost no detectable differences between males and 
females; the closest is in Table 5, although it is not true that women feel more satisfied than men 
in their workplace role.  
Some caveats remain.  First, in this study we have relied on what people tell us in surveys.  
If, say, men have a disproportionately greater propensity to conceal the truth, then our results 
might, in principle, be biased in some way.  It is possible that, perhaps as part of a desire to appear 
                                                          
11 Perhaps it should be added that is there no evidence for the possible additional hypothesis that women ask for 
promotion less often than men (see Appendix 2, where the gender dummy is insignificantly different from zero).      
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assertive, male workers are more likely than females to claim to have asked when they have not 12 
done so.  Second, this data set is for modern Australia.  If that country is unusual, the findings from 
our study might not apply elsewhere.   Third, our results hold when hours of work are held constant.  
This is natural, because we wish here to do a ceteris paribus comparison between males and 
females, but we have not attempted to explain the observed difference in the mean number of 
working hours between men and women. 13   Fourth, the analysis has been unable to explain 
properly why women are paid less than men.  
In conclusion, this paper documents evidence, of a direct and simple kind, that women do 
ask but do not get.  Such a finding is potentially consistent with the existence of discrimination in 
the labor market.  
                                                          
12 The authors of the paper would like to record that they are not persuaded about this; it is listed here only as a 
conceptual possibility.  Moreover, this kind of bias would lead to an under-estimate, not over-estimate, of women’s 
rate of asking.      
13 These differences in working hours presumably stem in part from historical and sociological differences in the 
gender roles.  See also the ideas in Gregory and Connolly (2008).      
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics (AWRS data 2013-2014)  
Number of observations: 4582 employees across 840 employers 
  Whole sample 
Variable Description Mean SD 
Female = 1 if worker is female and 0 if male 0.576 0.494 
Age Age of worker in years 40.374 12.506 
Age squared Age of worker squared 1,786.403 1,049.501 
English = 1 if English is primary language; 0 otherwise 0.860 0.347 
Married = 1 if married and 0 if not 0.519 0.500 
Dependents = 1 if worker has children 15 or younger; 0 if not 0.327 0.469 
Secondary = 1 if completed secondary education; 0 if not 0.241 0.428 
Certificate = 1 if completed certificate education; 0 if not 0.254 0.435 
Diploma = 1 if completed diploma education; 0 if not 0.147 0.354 
Bachelor degree = 1 if completed bachelor education; 0 if not 0.201 0.401 
Graduate = 1 if completed graduate education; 0 if not 0.064 0.244 
Post-graduate = 1 if completed postgraduate education; 0 if not 0.093 0.291 
Employer tenure Length of time spent with employer in years 5.808 6.039 
Weekly hours 
worked 
Usual weekly hours worked 37.154 10.882 
Part time job = 1 if weekly hours worked is less than 38; 0 if not 0.359 0.480 
Pay is negotiated  
= 1 if salary is a “negotiated amount with employer” 
and 0 otherwise 
0.389 0.488 
Successful 
= 1 if “successfully attained a better wage/salary 
through negotiating with the manager/employer 
(without changing roles) and 0 if not 
0.160 0.367 
Has asked for raise 
= 1 if “attempted to attain a better wage/salary since 
commencing employment with this employer” and 0 
otherwise 
0.696 0.460 
Has asked for 
promotion 
= 1 if “attempted to get a promotion” and 0 
otherwise 
0.891 0.312 
Satisfied with wage = 1 if “satisfied with wage/salary” and 0 otherwise 0.338 0.473 
No process 
= 1 if “there is no process/procedure to be able to 
access a better wage to perform role” and 0 
otherwise 
0.213 0.410 
Concerned about 
relationships 
= 1 if “concerned about negative effects on 
relationship with manager/employer” and 0 
otherwise 
0.136 0.342 
Role not worthy 
= 1 if “role wouldn’t be seen by manager/employer 
as worthy of a higher wage” and 0 otherwise 
0.150 0.357 
Satisfied in role = 1 if “satisfied in role” and 0 otherwise 0.235 0.424 
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Table 2: Gender sub-sample statistics (AWRS 2013-2014) 
 Males Females 
Variable Mean SD Mean SD 
Age 41.124 12.393 39.820 12.561 
Age squared 1,844.738 1,061.886 1,743.376 1,038.375 
English 0.852 0.355 0.866 0.341 
Married 0.579 0.494 0.475 0.499 
Dependents 0.369 0.483 0.297 0.457 
Secondary 0.245 0.430 0.238 0.426 
Certificate 0.270 0.444 0.242 0.429 
Diploma 0.136 0.343 0.155 0.362 
Bachelor degree 0.192 0.394 0.208 0.406 
Graduate 0.059 0.236 0.067 0.250 
Post-graduate 0.098 0.298 0.089 0.286 
Employer tenure 6.107 6.335 5.588 5.802 
Part time job 0.174 0.379 0.496 0.500 
Weekly hours worked 41.602 9.862 33.873 10.426 
‘Pay is negotiated’ 0.477 0.500 0.325 0.468 
‘Successful since joining’ 0.200 0.400 0.131 0.337 
‘I have asked for pay rise’ 0.745 0.436 0.660 0.474 
‘I have asked for promotion’ 0.902 0.298 0.883 0.322 
‘Satisfied with wage’ 0.361 0.481 0.324 0.468 
‘No process’ 0.182 0.387 0.231 0.422 
‘Concerned about relationships’ 0.146 0.354 0.129 0.336 
‘Role not worthy’ 0.160 0.367 0.144 0.352 
‘Satisfied in role’ 0.251 0.434 0.225 0.418 
 
The variable ‘pay is negotiated’ is a dummy for whether the employee says that pay levels are fixed by negotiation 
with the employer. ‘Successful since joining’ is a dummy for having attained a higher salary during this job tenure 
with the current employer. ‘I have asked for pay rise’ is a dummy for having requested a greater salary during this 
job tenure with the current employer.  ‘I have asked for promotion’ is a dummy for having requested a promotion 
with the current employer.  ‘Satisfied with wage’ is a dummy for reporting that I am satisfied with my income in the 
job with the current employer. ‘No process’ is a dummy for reporting that there is no process in this job for 
obtaining a higher salary.  ‘Concerned about relationships’ is a dummy for answering yes to “Why have you not 
attempted to attain a higher salary… I’m concerned about negative effects on my relationship with my 
manager/employer.”  ‘Role not worthy’ is a dummy for answering yes to “Why have you not attempted to attain a 
higher salary… My role wouldn’t be seen by my manager/employer as worthy of a higher wage.”  ‘Satisfied in role’ 
is a dummy for answering yes to “Why have you not attempted to attain a higher salary… I am satisfied in my role.”   
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Table 3: Regression Equations for My Pay is Negotiated, I Have Been Successful in Negotiating Since Joining, and I Have 
Asked for a Pay Rise (AWRS 2013-2014).  Includes a Full Set of 840 Employer-Dummy Variables. 
 Pay is negotiated  Successful since joining I have asked  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Female -0.092*** -0.072*** -0.060*** -0.056*** -0.049*** -0.040*** -0.068*** -0.048*** -0.026 
 (-5.502) (-4.328) (-3.471) (-3.988) (-3.198) (-2.598) (-3.776) (-2.566) (-1.420) 
Age 0.028*** 0.016*** 0.015*** 0.011*** 0.006** 0.005* 0.021*** 0.013*** 0.011*** 
 (7.301) (3.798) (3.504) (3.526) (1.572) (1.318) (5.173) (2.727) (2.302) 
Age squared -2.9x10-4*** -1.4x10-4*** -1.2x10-4*** -1.1x10-4*** -6.5x10-5** -5.3x10-5 -2.4x10-4*** -1.9x10-4*** -1.6x10-4*** 
 (-6.480) (-2.957) (-2.618) (-2.821) (-1.472) (-1.196) (-5.028) (-3.455) (-2.994) 
English 0.031 0.043** 0.040** -0.011 -0.006 -0.009 0.018 -0.003 -0.009 
 (1.506) (2.080) (1.899) (-0.605) (-0.330) (-0.468) (0.726) (-0.126) (-0.369) 
Married  0.016 0.017  0.033 0.034  0.003 0.005 
  (0.983) (1.072)  (2.452) (2.529)  (0.157) (0.299) 
Dependents  0.034 0.041**  -0.014 -0.009  -0.027 -0.015 
  (1.951) (2.350)  (-0.935) (-0.578)  (-1.415) (-0.778) 
Certificate  -0.015 -0.018*  -0.001 -0.003  0.048*** 0.043** 
  (-0.713) (-0.864)  (-0.057) (-0.188)  (2.258) (2.022) 
Diploma  0.011 0.011  0.026 0.026  0.032* 0.033** 
  (0.447) (0.465)  (1.238) (1.256)  (1.306) (1.347) 
Bachelor degree  0.078*** 0.080***  0.054* 0.055*  0.038 0.040 
  (3.221) (3.300)  (2.558) (2.610)  (1.457) (1.556) 
Graduate  0.075 0.072  0.049* 0.047*  0.023 0.020 
  (2.350) (2.297)  (1.745) (1.687)  (0.718) (0.609) 
Post-graduate  0.053* 0.052*  0.062* 0.061  0.025 0.022 
  (1.798) (1.755)  (2.339) (2.297)  (0.778) (0.699) 
Employer tenure  -0.004*** -0.004***  0.008*** 0.008***  0.022*** 0.021*** 
  (-2.723) (-2.876)  (6.049) (5.914)  (15.284) (15.103) 
Weekly hours worked   0.003***   0.002***   0.004*** 
   (5.510)   (3.412)   (-7.050) 
 20 
 
Occupational dummies No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Constant -0.205** 0.224*** 0.123*** -0.061 -2.6x10-4 -0.073 0.696*** 0.498*** 0.664*** 
 (-2.468) (2.209) (1.149) (-0.921) (-0.003) (-0.819) (8.140) (5.215) (6.498) 
R2 0.032 0.128 0.137 0.014 0.043 0.046 0.020 0.103 0.114 
 
T-statistics are in parentheses.  ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.  All estimations consist of 
4582 observations.  Standard errors are clustered by employer. 
 
This table -- as is true for later tables -- estimates a linear probability model.  The results from probit equations are closely equivalent; 
those are available from the authors on request. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 4: Part-time and Full-time Subsamples: Regression Equations for My Pay is 
Negotiated, I Have Been Successful in Negotiating Since Joining, and I Have Asked for a 
Pay Rise (AWRS 2013-2014).  Includes a Full Set of 840 Employer-Dummy Variables. 
 
Pay is negotiated 
Successful since 
joining 
I have asked 
 Part-time Full-time Part-time Full-time Part-time Full-time 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Female -0.023 -0.051** 0.039 -0.053** -0.026 -0.015 
 (-0.624) (-2.387) (1.374) (-2.396) (-0.608) (-0.619) 
Demographic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Job controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.058 0.172 0.340 -0.198* -0.181 -0.625*** 
 (0.242) (1.259) (1.430) (-1.748) (-0.926) (-4.817) 
R2 0.090 0.111 0.046 0.033 0.073 0.101 
Observations 1646 2936 1646 2936 1646 2936 
 
T-statistics are in parentheses.  ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 
10% levels.  Standard errors are clustered by employer. 
 
Demographic and job controls are as listed in Table 3. 
 
Part-time here is defined as < 38 hours per week. 
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Table 5: Regression Equations for the Reasons that I Did Not Ask for a Pay Rise: (i) I Am 
Satisfied with My Wage and (ii) I Am Satisfied with My Role (AWRS 2013-2014). Includes a 
Full Set of 840 Employer-Dummy Variables. 
 Satisfied with wage Satisfied in role 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Female 0.070** 0.095** 0.072* -0.024 -0.070** -0.093*** 
 (2.116) (2.502) (1.844) (-1.073) (-2.059) (-2.665) 
Age -0.010 -0.009 -0.007 -0.012** -0.009 -0.008 
 (-1.174) (-0.913) (-0.759) (-2.411) (-1.043) (-0.878) 
Age squared 1.5x10-4 1.5x10-4 1.3x10-4 1.7x10-4*** 1.4x10-4 1.1x10-4 
 (1.545) (1.316) (1.123) (2.945) (1.310) (1.099) 
English 0.085* 0.074 0.075 0.049 0.075* 0.075* 
 (1.951) (1.612) (1.636) (1.619) (1.766) (1.812) 
Married  -0.025 -0.022  0.050 0.052* 
  (-0.720) (-0.635)  (1.543) (1.651) 
Dependents  -0.003 -0.025  -0.008 -0.031 
  (-0.067) (-0.620)  (-0.213) (-0.809) 
Certificate  -0.009 -0.006  -0.008 -0.004 
  (-0.216) (-0.132)  (-0.188) (-0.104) 
Diploma  -0.025 -0.031  0.029 0.023 
  (-0.437) (-0.546)  (0.585) (0.460) 
Bachelor degree  0.013 0.013  0.023 0.023 
  (0.259) (0.259)  (0.489) (0.497) 
Graduate  -0.117* -0.111  0.078 0.084 
  (-1.685) (-1.583)  (1.102) (1.185) 
Post-graduate  -0.028 -0.025  -0.059 -0.055 
  (-0.427) (-0.375)  (-1.018) (-0.956) 
Employer tenure  -0.001 -0.001  0.002 0.002 
  (-0.231) (-0.148)  (0.581) (0.675) 
Weekly hours worked   -0.005***   -0.005*** 
   (-2.858)   (-3.095) 
Occupational dummies No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Constant 0.336** 0.650*** 0.862*** 0.374*** 0.114 0.327 
 (2.049) (2.691) (3.447) (3.732) (0.549) (1.485) 
R2 0.010 0.021 0.026 0.015 0.027 0.037 
 
T-statistics are in parentheses.  ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 
10% levels.  All estimations consist of 1593 observations.  Standard errors are clustered by 
employer. 
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Table 6: Regression Equations for the Reasons that I Did Not Ask for a Pay Rise: (iii) 
There is No Process Here, (iv) I Am Concerned about My Relationships, (v) My Role is not 
Worthy of Higher Pay (AWRS 2013-2014). Includes a Full Set of 840 Employer-Dummy 
Variables. 
 No process 
Concerned about 
relationships 
Role not worthy 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Female -0.053 -0.012 -0.015 
 (-1.546) (-0.397) (-0.429) 
Demographic controls Yes Yes Yes 
Job Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.158 0.090 -0.042 
 (0.883) (0.573) (-0.248) 
R2 0.030 0.024 0.030 
 
T-statistics are in parentheses.  ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 
5% and 10% levels.  All estimations consist of 1593 observations.  Standard errors are 
clustered by employer. 
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Appendix 1A: Estimations by Age Sub-Samples (AWRS 2013-2014).  Full Set of 840 
Employer-Dummies Included. 
 Pay is negotiated 
Successful since 
joining 
I have asked 
 Age<41 Age>40 Age<41 Age>40 Age<41 Age>40 
Female -0.008 -0.123*** -0.019 -0.077*** -0.041 0.009 
 (-0.329) (-4.100) (-0.875) (-2.912) (-1.445) (0.335) 
English 0.033 0.033 0.024 -0.078** -0.003 0.008 
 (1.000) (1.022) (0.907) (-2.343) (-0.093) (0.190) 
Married 0.032 0.011 0.031 0.033 0.058** -0.043* 
 (1.187) (0.504) (1.314) (1.606) (2.145) (-1.815) 
Dependents 0.068** 0.029 -0.004 -0.015 -0.060** 0.011 
 (2.427) (1.255) (-0.170) (-0.691) (-2.115) (0.434) 
Certificate 0.021 -0.042 0.006 -0.036 0.049 0.040 
 (0.695) (-1.446) (0.228) (-1.320) (1.481) (1.217) 
Diploma 0.039 -0.019 0.009 0.039 -0.016 0.080** 
 (1.029) (-0.568) (0.265) (1.167) (-0.402) (2.089) 
Bachelor degree 0.081** 0.086** 0.055* 0.045 0.038 0.085** 
 (2.325) (2.557) (1.761) (1.309) (1.039) (2.074) 
Graduate 0.040 0.094** 0.027 0.056 0.041 0.040 
 (0.743) (1.960) (0.673) (1.224) (0.787) (0.862) 
Post-graduate 0.020 0.088* 0.066 0.065 0.052 0.046 
 (0.463) (1.916) (1.600) (1.541) (1.034) (0.928) 
Employer tenure -0.003 -0.002 0.016*** 0.005*** 0.041*** 0.015*** 
 (-0.940) (-1.544) (5.646) (3.408) (11.411) (8.872) 
Weekly hours worked 0.004*** 0.001 0.002* 0.002** 0.004*** 0.007*** 
 (2.787) (1.041) (1.681) (2.065) (3.321) (4.873) 
Occupational dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.442*** 0.592*** 0.012 0.105 0.428*** 0.354*** 
 (3.974) (6.362) (0.125) (1.328) (4.006) (3.971) 
R2 0.112 0.160 0.048 0.043 0.130 0.107 
Observations 2370 2212 2370 2212 2370 2212 
 
T-statistics are in parentheses.  ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 
10% levels.  Standard errors are clustered by employer. 
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Appendix 1B: Estimations for I Have Asked for a Pay Rise by Tenure Sub-Samples 
(AWRS 2013-2014).  Includes a Full Set of 840 Employer-Dummy Variables. 
 
 I have asked for a pay rise 
 Tenure<1 year Tenure<3 years Tenure<5 years 
Female -0.047 -0.017 -0.010 
 (-0.419) (-0.466) (-0.326) 
Age 0.015 0.009 0.015** 
 (0.510) (0.931) (2.052) 
Age squared -2.7x10-4 -1.4x10-4 -2.2x10-4** 
 (-0.718) (-1.198) (-2.328) 
English 0.088 -0.050 -0.027 
 (0.607) (-1.241) (-0.813) 
Married 0.107 0.017 0.015 
 (1.081) (0.500) (0.575) 
Dependents -0.120 -0.063* -0.055* 
 (-1.401) (-1.680) (-1.867) 
Certificate -0.007 0.057 0.053 
 (-0.067) (1.328) (1.564) 
Diploma -0.105 0.029 0.048 
 (-0.675) (0.566) (1.178) 
Bachelor degree 0.270*** -0.021 0.033 
 (3.066) (-0.437) (0.837) 
Graduate 0.252** 0.020 0.040 
 (2.066) (0.334) (0.780) 
Post-graduate 0.489** 0.014 0.037 
 (2.482) (0.246) (0.739) 
Weekly hours worked 0.001 0.003* 0.003** 
 (0.183) (1.779) (2.209) 
Occupational dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 1.171* 0.422* 0.365** 
 (1.822) (1.945) (2.184) 
R2 0.032 0.049 0.054 
Observations 413 1976 2687 
 
T-statistics are in parentheses.  ***, ** and * represent statistical significance 
at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.  Standard errors are clustered by employer. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 26 
 
Appendix 2:  Estimations for I Have Asked for a Promotion (AWRS 2013-2014). Includes a 
Full Set of 840 Employer-Dummy Variables. 
 
 I have asked for a promotion 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Female -0.008 0.003 0.013 
 (-0.717) (0.199) (0.971) 
Age 0.015*** 0.011*** 0.010*** 
 (4.698) (3.341) (3.019) 
Age squared -1.6x10-4*** -1.3x10-4*** -1.2x10-4*** 
 (-4.259) (-3.263) (-2.896) 
English -0.003 -0.014 -0.017 
 (-0.206) (-0.877) (-1.067) 
Married  1.8x10-4 0.001 
  (0.014) (0.108) 
Dependents  -0.004 0.002 
  (-0.297) (0.167) 
Certificate  0.022 0.019 
  (1.581) (1.389) 
Diploma  0.016 0.016 
  (0.912) (0.937) 
Bachelor degree  -0.008 -0.007 
  (-0.449) (-0.374) 
Graduate  0.000 -0.002 
  (0.007) (-0.068) 
Post-graduate  -0.023 -0.024 
  (-0.981) (-1.035) 
Employer tenure  0.004*** 0.004*** 
  (4.932) (4.741) 
Weekly hours worked   0.002*** 
   (3.803) 
Occupational dummies No Yes Yes 
Constant 0.573*** 0.737*** 0.652*** 
 (8.623) (9.970) (8.480) 
R2 0.014 0.040 0.047 
T-statistics are in parentheses.  ***, ** and * represent statistical significance 
at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.  All estimations consist of 4582 observations.  
Standard errors are clustered by employer. 
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Appendix 3: Extracts from the Questionnaire Wording in the AWRS Survey 
 
Method of Setting Pay  
C1 How is your wage/salary determined?  
Please select one response only  
CODE FRAMES  MOSP 
Negotiated amount with my employer  1 
By an enterprise agreement (EBA)  2 
By an award (i.e. the relevant pay rate contained in the award, and no more)  3 
My employer offered me an amount that was more than the award/standard rate, 
and I accepted  
4 
Other (Please specify)  990 
Don’t know 997 
 
Salary Negotiations (After Commencement)  
C2 Which of the following best describes the actions you have taken in relation to your 
wage/salary since you commenced your employment with your employer?  
Please select all that apply  
[PROGRAMMER: A RESPONDENT CAN’T BE CODE 7 IF THEY ARE CODE 4, AND 
CAN’T BE CODE 6 IF THEY ARE CODES 2, 3 OR 5]  
CODE FRAMES  SALNEG1 
I received a better wage/salary without pursuing it  1 
I have successfully attained a better wage/salary for myself through a promotion  2 
I have successfully attained a better wage/salary for myself through negotiating 
with my manager/employer (i.e. without changing roles)  
3 
I have attempted to attain a better wage/salary for myself though applying for a 
promotion, but have been unsuccessful  
4 
I have attempted to attain a better wage/salary for myself in my role, but was 
unsuccessful (e.g. request refused or ignored)  
5 
I have not attempted to attain a better wage/salary for myself since I commenced 
employment with this employer  
6 
I have not attempted to get a promotion 7 
Prefer not to say 998 
 
Why No Salary Negotiations 
[ASK IF C2 (SALNEG) = CODE 6 OR CODE 7] 
C2a Why have you not attempted to attain a better wage/promotion for yourself since you 
commenced your employment? 
Please select all that apply 
CODE FRAMES SALNEG2 
I’m satisfied with my wage/salary 1 
There is no process/procedure to be able to access a better wage to perform my role 2 
I’m concerned about negative effects on my relationship with my 
manager/employer 
3 
My role wouldn’t be seen by my manager/employer as worthy of a higher wage 4 
I am satisfied in my role 5 
Other (Please specify) 990 
Prefer not to say 998 
 
 
